#Log file spy driver
#Log file spy windows

#Log file spy driver

It is possible to induce side effects from a race condition by hammering on the target system for a long time, like using a GUI driver to exercise the target system for days until something bad happens. The goal is to find and fix them internally, before the race condition might show up at some medical institution or found by the bug bounty program in a very public fashion. Humans (probably) don't fulfill the first part of that definition (unless they are an implementation?), and the race condition doesn't fulfill the last part.My company makes medical devices, so we treat race conditions as vulns, even if no external actor has discovered any way (yet) of inducing the race condition. Was this part of the scope validation that was supposed to be done by the apps but is now handled by the library? They use the example of enterprise vs consumer accounts but that doesn't mean that those are the only things the scope is checking.Bigger question: how long have these hackers actually been fishing through MS's data trough, and how many more of these certs exist there? One thing I'm not sure about is why the expired key was still accepted. Once they had said key how did they find out about the mail vulnerability? Did they already know about it and that's why they went looking for the key or did they just try using the key everywhere they thought might be interesting and happen to find the mail issue? Like how did they find the key? Did they actually know about the race condition to know to look in the crash dump? Did they somehow manage to do a brute force scan for the signing keys without getting caught? There are definitely still things you can fault MS for but this also shows some pretty serious skills and dedication by the hackers. In this case, however, a previously unknown vulnerability known as a “race condition” prevented that mechanism from working properly. Normally, crash dumps strip out signing keys and similarly sensitive data. The hack of a Microsoft engineer’s corporate account allowed Storm-0558 to access the crash dump and, with it, the expired Exchange signing key. The crash dump was later moved into Microsoft’s debugging environment.

#Log file spy windows

When a workstation in the dedicated production environment crashed, Windows performed a standard “crash dump,” in which all data stored in memory is written to disk so engineers can later diagnose the cause.

Those safeguards broke down in April 2021, more than two years before Storm-0558 gained access to Microsoft’s network.

Further, this environment is segregated from the rest of Microsoft’s network, where workers have access to email and other types of tools. To safeguard this dedicated environment, email, conferencing, web research, and other collaboration tools aren’t allowed because they provide the most common vectors for successful malware and phishing attacks. Such keys, Microsoft said, are entrusted only to employees who have undergone a background check and then only when they are using dedicated workstations protected by multi-factor authentication using hardware token devices. Storm-0558 then used the access to steal the key. The corporate account of one of its engineers had been hacked. On Wednesday, Microsoft finally solved the riddles.